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Abstract
The analytic philosophy of Robert Brandom, based on the ideas
of pragmatism, paints a picture of sapience, through inferentialism.
In this paper, we present a theory, that utilizes essential elements of
Brandom’s philosophy, towards the objective of achieving strong-AI.
We do this by connecting the constitutive elements of reinforcement
learning and the Game Of Giving and Asking For Reasons. Further,
following Brandom’s prescriptive thoughts, we restructure the popular
reinforcement learning algorithm A3C, and show that RL algorithms
can be tuned towards the objective of strong-AI.
1 Introduction
The analytic philosophy of Robert Brandom situates itself with the demarca-
tion question: what does it mean to be us? In the process, Brandom presents
a layer-cake picture of sapience, thus categorizing agents into one of three
categories: simple performers, rational being, and logical beings, in increasing or-
der of their sapience. Brandom’s approach to evaluate a being’s sapience is
through the Game Of Giving and Asking For Reasons (GOGAR). Brandom
claims that this game is a prototypical representation of a social practice,
and it is possible to evaluate a being’s sapience just by their nature of par-
ticipation within that game. It is also possible to draw parallels between
Brandom’s treatment of sapience, and John Searle’s distinction of weak and
strong AI; where the highest level of sapience in Brandom’s philosophy (log-
ical beings) is strong-AI [1]. In relation to artificial intelligence, this presents
a practical approach to re-imagine models with the purpose of advancing
them towards strong-AI.
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In this paper, we draw the theoretical links between one such class of
models i.e. reinforcement learning, and Brandom’s philosophy of sapience.
We do this by connecting the constitutive elements of reinforcement learning
and Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), to Brandom’s ideas of inferential-
ism. Further, with the objective of exploring a trajectory towards strong-AI,
we restructure the popular reinforcement learning Asynchronous Advan-
tage Actor-Critic (A3C), in accordance with Brandom’s philosophy. Finally,
looking through the lens of Brandom’s philosophy, we show that it is in
principle possible to re-imagine reinforcement learning algorithms towards
that objective.
2 Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning (RL) is loosely inspired by the psychology of re-
wards and punishment. This is based on the neurological evidence of
dopamine release in a mammal brain, which functions to shape reward
driven behavior. RL is one of the popular machine learning techniques
along with supervised and unsupervised learning, where the focus is on
goal directed learning. Mathematically, reinforcement learning is modeled
using a Markov Decision Process (MDP) [2]. MDP is a discrete 1 state
transition model which consists of:
• States (S): The set of states the agent can be in. This helps the agent to
form a representation of the environment based on its perception. For
e.g. sensor readings of a robot
• Actions (A): The set of actions the agent can take.
• Transition function (T(S′|S, A)): This is the environment model, and
is expressed as a probability distribution over states that the agent can
land into (S′), if it takes the action A in state S,
• Reward function (R(S, A, S′)): The real valued reward function that
the agent receives as a result of taking an action A in state S. Popular
notation represents reward function as being dependent on the next
state (S′) as well as on the current state and action (S, A).
• Discount factor (γ): This controls the preference the agent gives to the
immediate rewards as compared to rewards in the future.
Figure 1 shows an MDP with the state transition probabilities, and the
corresponding reward values that the agent receive for each state-action
pair. RL being a goal-oriented learning mechanism, the agent progressively
1most principles of MDP translate directly to a continuous version of MDP
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Figure 1: A Markov Decision Process with state transition probabilities, and
reward values shown within braces.
learns a sequence of actions (policy) to take in order achieve a pre-defined
objective. Often, the learning process is framed in a manner such that the
sequence of actions that maximizes the rewards gathered along the way
(optimal policy), results in achieving that objective.
To facilitate the learning process, the agent maintain one or more of the
following functions:
• a policy function pi : S→ A that maps states to actions the agent can
take in that state.
• a state-value function V : S → R that represents the goodness of the
state 2. It is the expected discounted sum of future rewards the agent
can receive from that state onward.
vpi(s)
.
= Epi[Gt|St = s] = Epi
[
∞
∑
k=0
γkRt+k+1|St = s
]
where Epi[·] is the expected value of a random variable, given that the
agent follows the policy pi, t is the time step, and Gt is the expected
sum of return from state s.
• an action-value function Q : S × A → R that is similar to the state-
value function, but represents the goodness of taking an action, given
a certain state.
qpi(s, a)
.
= Epi[Gt|St = s, At = a] = Epi
[
∞
∑
k=0
γkRt+k+1|St = s, At = a
]
2A note on the notation: Capitalized V and Q is used for tabular representation, whereas
v and q is used for functional representation.
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2.1 Algorithms in Reinforcement Learning
Figure 2: Categorization of various algorithms for reinforcement learning.
Figure 2 shows the main categorizes that popular reinforcement learning
algorithms 3. This section gives a short description of each category, and
subsequently elaborates the algorithms that are relevant for the development
of the philosophical connections in the later sections.
Value Function based algorithms like the Q-learning [3] and SARSA [4]
maintains an explicit representation of the q or the v functions, and use them
to find an optimal policy of behavior (pi∗). On the other hand direct policy
based algorithms like REINFORCE [5], finds an optimal policy of behavior
without maintaining an explicit representation of the q or v functions. Actor-
critic [2] are a class of algorithms that combine the value function based and
direct policy based methods into a single algorithm.
Model-based and model-free are another categorization of RL algorithms.
Model-based methods maintains and learns an explicit representation of
the transition function (T), and uses that to calculate the value functions,
subsequently deriving the optimal policy. Whereas, model-free approaches
do not maintain an explicit representation of the transition function.
Q-learning
Q-learning is model-free algorithm that iteratively learns, as the name sug-
gests, the Q-function. The optimal policy can then be derived by a one-step
search.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode for Q-learning. The algorithm is
initialized with an initial estimate of the Q function. At each step, the
agent takes an action a that is derived from the current Q value (Step 5),
and observes the reward R (Step 6). The derivation of an action from a
given Q function is based on the equation: argmaxa Q(S, A). The essence
3http://www0.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/d.silver/web/Teaching.html
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Algorithm 1 Q-learning
1: procedure Q-LEARNING(Q)
2: repeat
3: until terminal state
4: for each episode do
5: Choose action a from policy derived from Q (e -greedy)
6: Take action a, observer reward R, and next state S′
7: Q(S, A)← Q(S, A) + α[R + γmaxa Q(S′, A)−Q(S, A)]
8: S← S′
9: end for
10: end procedure
of Q-learning is step 7, which incrementally updates the older Q function
estimate based on the reward received in step 6. Difference between the new
and old estimates of V or Q function, in this form is commonly referred to
as the TD-error.
Direct policy search - REINFORCE
REINFORCE is direct policy search algorithm which maintains an approxi-
mation of the policy function pi(a|s). The actual policy function is approxi-
mated with a parameterized representation of the form pi(a|s, θ), where θ is
the parameters of the function. Algorithm 2 presents the psudocode of the
algorithm.
In every iteration, similar to Q-learning, the algorithm updates the policy
through stochastic gradient ascent on the parameter θ, thus improving the
estimate of the policy representation pi(a|s, θ).
Algorithm 2 REINFORCE
1: procedure REINFORCE(θ)
2: repeat:
3: Generate an episode S0, A0, R1, ...ST−1, AT−1, RT, following pi(.|., θ)
4: for each step of the episode do
5: Gt ← return from step t
6: θ ← θ + αγtGt∆θ logpi(At|St, θ)
7: end for
8: end procedure
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2.1.1 Actor-critic algorithm
Algrithm 3 presents the psudocode of hte algorithm. Actor-critic combines
the above algorithms into a single algorithm, where a temporal-difference is
calculated to update the value function. This is in principle similar to TD-
learning, the only difference being that the value function is represented in
a parametric form v(s, w). Thus, the value function is updated as stochastic
gradient update of the weights w (step 7), instead of a step update like in
TD-learning. This temporal-difference is also used to update the parameters
of the policy function pi(a|s, θ) (step 8), similar to REINFORCE. Detailed
derivation and description of the notation is provided in the footnote link 4.
Algorithm 3 Actor Critic algorithm
1: procedure ACTOR-CRITIC(w, θ)
2: Repeat forever:
3: while terminal state not reached do
4: Choose action a according to the actors current policy pi(.|S, θ)
5: Take action a, observer reward R, and next state S′
6: δ← R + γvˆ(S′, w)− vˆ(S, w) . temporal difference error
7: w← w + βδ∆w ˆv(S, w) . gradient update of critic’s value
function parameters
8: θ ← θ + αIδ∆θ logpi(A|S, θ) . gradient update of actors’s policy
parameters
9: I ← γI
10: S← S′
11: end while
12: end procedure
Figure 3: Schematic representation of actor-critic algorithm.
4http://ufal.mff.cuni.cz/~straka/courses/npfl114/2016/sutton-
bookdraft2016sep.pdf#page=288
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A3C: Asynchronous Advantage Actor-Critic algorithm
Asynchronous Advantage Actor Critic (AC3) algorithm is a parallel asyn-
chronous multi-threaded implementation of actor-critic algorithm (Figure 4)
[6]. The psudocode of A3C is shown in algorithm 4. Each thread is identical
to actor-critic algorithm, however, instead of updating gradients at each
step, like in actor-critic, the A3C algorithm accumulates the gradients (steps
6,7), and performs an asynchronous update to the global actor-critic unit
after TMAX steps (steps 9,10).
Algorithm 4 A3C pseudocode for each thread
1: procedure A3C(w, θ)
2: repeat:
3: Generate an episode S0, A0, R1, ...STMAX−1, ATMAX−1, RTMAX , following
pi(·|·, `)
4: for each step i of the episode do
5: δ← Ri + γvˆ(S′, w)− vˆ(S, w) . temporal difference error
6: dw← dw + βδ∆w ˆv(S, w) . gradient accumulation of critic’s
value function parameters
7: dθ ← dθ + αIδ∆θ logpi(A|S, θ) . gradient accumulator of
actors’s policy parameters
8: end for
9: Perform asynchronous update of global w using dw for global critic
10: Perform asynchronous update of global θ using dθ for global actor
11: end procedure
Figure 4: Schematic representation of Asynchronous Advantage Actor Critic
algorithm (A3C) algorithm.
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3 Philosophy of Robert Brandom
Background
Robert Brandom (b.1950) is a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the
University of Pittsburgh, where he has been a member of the faculty since
1976. He completed his PhD at Princeton University under the guidance
of Richard Rorty. Most notable of Brandom’s work include Making It Ex-
plicit, and a set of lecture publications delivered at the University of Oxford
titled Between Saying and Doing. Brandom’s philosophy is grounded on the
idea of pragmatism 5, and his work falls under the philosophy of language,
philosophy of mind, and philosophy of logic. His main contribution is infer-
entialism, where he shows how the process of making inferences imparts
semantic meaning to things [7][8].
3.1 Sapience
The starting point of Brandom’s philosophy is the question:
What is the difference between a parrot who is disposed reliably
to respond differentially to the presence of red things by saying
"Raawk, that’s red". and a human reporter who makes the same
noise under the same circumstances [9].
Simply put, this question asks what does it mean to be us? Asking this
question has significant value in the philosophy of AI, where recent advances
and widespread acceptance of artificial intelligence technologies have drawn
society to introspect on the question what it means to be human. Brandom’s
response to this question is by arguing that a parrot’s behavior is not a part
of a special kind of norm governed social practice. Building up on the same
argument, he presents a layer-cake picture of sapience, leading him to list
three types of beings6, ordered based on their sapience [10].
Simple performers: Simple performers, or the type Brandom calls Reliable
Differential Responsive Dispostion, are reactive systems. They can be imag-
ined to have a read and write head, where based on an input signal, it has
the ability to differentially produce certain types of response outputs.
Rational beings: One step higher in the chain of sapience, are rational
beings. Brandom says that what differentiates rational beings from simple
performers is their ability to make moves in a Game Of Giving and Asking
for Reasons (GOGAR). Brandom presents a detailed elaboration of what
this game constitutes, and we would look into this in subsequent sections.
5https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/
6The terminology of logical and rational is of Brandom’s own choosing, and might not
translate directly to a colloquial understanding of these words.
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Brandom further claims that it is possible for a simple performer to
achieve the ability of rational beings, through a more complex deployment
of its abilities - the ability to draw inferences. For example, if someone is
presented with an offer of employment, they have the option of signing it
and taking the job. To take this all important decision, a rational being might
consider all the consequences of signing that offer, for example, having
to wake up 6 a.m. every weekday, being able to earn money. Thus, this
interaction of signing the offer might be imagined to be an input-output
relation where the input is the presentation of the offer, and the output is
signing it. Although both simple performer and rational beings can take
part in this interaction with the help of their abilities, what sets rational
beings apart is the ability to draw inferences as a consequence of the output
action.
Logical Beings: Further in the chain of sapience are logical beings. They
distinguish themselves from rational beings by being able to deploy a special
kind of vocabulary, which Brandom terms elaboration and explication.
Elaboration is a relation between two practical abilities. For instance the
relation between the ability to do multiplication and subtraction (P1), and
the ability to do long-form division (P2) [10]. The relation between P1 and
P2 is such that, it is possible to achieve the ability P2 entirely from the ability
P1 through a step wise process. Elaboration is this process of step-by-step
algorithmic derivation to achieve one ability from the other. Other than
algorithmic derivation, elaboration also includes another form of derivation
i.e. elaboration-by-training. This can be understood as the derivation of
one ability from another, where the process of derivation is more complex
than just a step-by-step algorithmic process. For example, ability to draw a
passable picture of a human from the ability to draw a passable picture of a
stick figure.
Explication is the act of making explicit the principles that codifies a
practical know-how. For example, expressing in some linguistic form the
ability to ride a bicycle, or swinging a baseball bat is an act of explication.
Elaboration and explication in conjunction is referred to as LX-vocabulary.
This vocabulary can contain normative expressions like ’...is committed
to...’, ascriptional phrases like ’...says’, or conditional phrases of the form
’if....else...’. Brandom states that the list of LX-vocabulary is unbounded, and
any vocabulary that assists in the process of elaboration and explication can
be considered a logical vocabulary.
Figure 5 shows the three types of beings in increasing order of sapience
(bottom to top). Critics of Brandom argue if it is at all possible to conceptu-
alize rational beings as separate from logical beings. My understanding is
that rational beings is a stepping stone towards logical beings from simple
9
Figure 5: Layer-cake picture of sapience in an increasing order from bottom
(simple performers) to top (logical beings)
performers. In relation to Searle’s Chinese room thought experiment [11]
that passes a Turing test (or what he calls weak AI), Brandom’s rational
beings would be an instantiation of weak-AI that passes that Turing test.
Thus, whereas a rational being perform a series of statements and inferences,
thereby passing a Turing test, it is only logical beings who have the ability
to understand that performance (strong-AI).
3.2 Game of Giving and Asking For Reasons (GOGAR)
An essential aspect of Brandom’s philosophy is his account of sapience.
Whereas the previous section presented his work on the three categories and
their hierarchy in the ladder of sapience, this section presents his account
of the necessary and sufficient conditions that can qualify a sapient being
(rational or logical). This can be understood through the interaction of a
being in a given social practice7, or what form those interactions should be,
to qualify as sapient (rational or logical). Brandom does this by mapping a
being’s interaction within a social practice to a specific game - the Game of
Giving and Asking For Reasons (GOGAR) (Figure 6).
The main elements of the GOGAR game are 8
• Players and Scorekeepers: Each individual in the game acts as players
7A social practice can be imagined to be any interaction among beings (humans or not).
E.g. in relation to our previous example, engaging in the process of employment can be an
example of a social practice.
8For the sake of purity, I have retained the original terminologies of the game without
modification. These terminologies sometimes seem unintuitive. Thus, whenever possible, I
have tried to add subjective descriptions for clarity.
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(while making a move), as well as scorekeepers to other player’s
moves.
• counters: There are infinite distinct counters in the game. The counters
(C) can be thought to be tokens. Each counter is related to other
counters through a relation of committive consequences (cc):
C0
cc
=⇒ (C1 ∧ C2 ∧ C3 ∧ ...)
• commitment move: This is an act of the player taking a counter and
placing it in their commitment box. As a part of the move, the player
also has to place all other counters that participate in the committive
consequence relation to the chosen counter. This can be interpreted
as an act of making a claim (either through statements or through
actions). Forcing the player to place the counters in cc relation can be
interpreted as being held to the consequences of making that claim.
For example making a claim of ’signing an employment offer letter’
might draw committive consequence of ’coming to work at 9am’ and
’wearing a bowtie’.
• entitlement move: Similar to commitment move, players can place
copies of the counters already in their commitment boxes into entitle-
ment boxes. The difference between entitlement and commitment is
that a player is obligated to defend an entitlement, if it is challenged
by a scorekeeper. A challenge by the scorekeeper can be understood
as the scorekeeper not accepting a claim. For example, if the employee
claims ’receiving travel allowance’ as a cc of ’signing an employment
offer letter’, then the HR manager (acting as a scorekeeper) can choose
not to accept that claim. The player would have to then remove that
claim from their entitlement box.
• A-ing (asserting): A scorekeeper can consider a claim by the player as an
a-ing move iff the claim is an entitled one and the player is committed
to defend that entitlement if challenged by any other scorekeeper.
4 Reinforcement learning semantics and Brandom-ian
philosophy
As we discussed in the previous section, both commitments and entitlements
use the relation of commitive consequnce as a mode to express claims. Even
the scorekeeper’s challenge to players are expressed through the modality
placing counters (and counters that form a cc relation to that counter), that
11
Figure 6: A representation of the Game Of Giving and Asking for Reasons
are in opposition to the counters placed by the player. Thus, the counters
and the relation of cc is the basic structure on which the GOGAR game
is built. It is also relevant here to refresh the intuitive explanation of the
counter and the act of placing the counter. Whereas a counters represents
the set of all possible claims, the act of placing a counter is the pragmatic
action of execution of that claim (through saying or doing something) by the
player.
Thus, one way we relate reinforcement learning semantics to Brando-
mian philosophy is by connecting the structural elements of RL, to the
structural elements of GOGAR.
An MDP distinguishes between a state (S) and an action A, whereas
GOGAR does not have such explicit distinction. It uses counters and the
committive consequence relation among them. Reproducing our earlier
notation, this structure in GOGAR can be represented as:
C0
cc
=⇒ (C1 ∧ C2 ∧ C3 ∧ ...) (1)
In reinforcement learning, a policy function maps a state to an action 9,
which can be represented in the form (refer Figure 7):
s1 → a1 ∧ s2 → a3 ∧ ... (2)
If we combine states and actions into a tuple such that
xi,j = (si, aj) ∈ X|pi(si, aj) = 1 ∀i, j ∈N (3)
xi,j → xm,n =
{
true, if T(si, sm) ≥ 0
f alse, T(si, sm) = 0
(4)
9A stochastic policy function is a probability distribution on the states and the action
pi(s, a). However, a deterministic policy is a special case where, given a state, pi(s, a) is 1
for at most one action, and 0 for all other. Although we consider only deterministic policies
here; extension to stochastic policies are left as a future work
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Figure 7: Policy function representation in an MDP
where T(s, a) is the transition function, then the same policy function
can be represented as
x1,1 → (x2,3 ∧ x4,3)... (5)
Thus, with the above reformulation, we can see that formulation (1)
of GOGAR and formulation (5) of reinforcement learning are structurally
equivalent. This brings us to our link 1:
Link 1: The commitive consequence relation among tokens in GOGAR
is structurally equivalent to a policy in reinfocement learning.
Our treatment of the above link between RL and Brandom’s philosphy
also gives us a fresh perspective to reinforcement learning and MDP. We
often view an MDP as a barebone mathematical model devoid of any innate
meaning. It gets it’s meaning only through how an MDP and reinforcement
learning is applied to a specific application. However, our conjecture is
this need not be the case. Since the state-action tuple (xi,j) is equivalent to
Brandom’s use of counters (C) in GOGAR, we can use state-action tuples
(xi,j), as basic building blocks towards a strong-AI, just like how the counters
13
build up towards the sapience of logical beings 10
Next, we delve into the semantics of the counters and committive conse-
quence relation in GOGAR. Brandom’s position on semantics of the commit-
tive consequence is related to a constitutive view of a social practice. In other
words, the specific social practice in which the counters and cc relations ap-
pear, is the source of the semantics. Intuitively, it helps to understand this in
reference to our previous example. The commitive consequence of ’signing
an employment offer’ to ’waking up at 6am’ has meaning only because of the
social practice of ’engaging in the process of employment’. Thus, the social
practice have a constitutive function in relation to committive relationships
[12].
More formally, this means that any committive consequence in the for-
mulation (1) needs to be indexed in reference to the social practice p ∈ P,
where P is the superset of all social practices.
[C0
cc
=⇒ (C1 ∧ C2 ∧ C3 ∧ ...)]p because ∃p ∈ P (6)
Taking a similar line of argument of reinforcement learning, we can
claim that RL policy formulation of the form (5), has semantic meaning
only through the transition relation T. We have already established this
structurally in equation (4). However, semantically we can say that
[x1,1 → (x2,3 ∧ x4,3)...]T because ∃T ∈ T (7)
where T is the superset of all possible transition functions. This equiva-
lence between equation (6) and (7) brings us to the second link:
Link 2: The transition function, or the underlying model of the en-
vironment in reinforcement learning can be understood as the social
practice in a GOGAR.
Re-imagined actor-critic and A3C
Having drawn structural and semantic links between reinforcement learning
and Brandom’s philosophy, we now connect the two on the basis of the
reinforcement learning algorithms discussed in section 2.1. We do this by
asking the following questions:
• 1. If being able to play the GOGAR is a necessary condition of sapience, can
a reinforcement learning algorithm play the game?
10This is directly derived by drawing parallels between Searle’s use of strong-AI, and
Brandom’s logical beings being an instance of that.
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• 2. If the path towards a logical being, and strong-AI, is through the deploy-
ment of a set of logical vocabulary, can that algorithm deploy that vocabulary?
To address the first question, we restructure the A3C algorithm, already
introduced in section 2.1, in line with the GOGAR game, thereby showing
that threads participating in AC3 can play the game. 11
Figure 8: Restructured actor-critic unit in A3C
First, we restructure the basic actor-critic units of the A3C. Figure 8
shows the new restructured actor-critic unit in an A3C algorithm. Instead
of a static assignment of actor and critic, as in the original algorithm, we
introduce the idea of a participant unit (pu) (shown within the red box in the
figure), and actor and critic just being dynamic roles played by a pu. Each
participant unit holds a value function representation v(s, w), which helps
them play the role of a critic, as well as a policy representation pi(a|s, θ),
which helps the same participating unit play the role of an actor. This is in
accordance with the GOGAR where a participant plays the dual roles of
player and scorekeeper.
Next, we restructure the complete algorithm as shown in Figure 9. Algo-
rithm 5 shows the psudocode of the algorithm. The algorithm is initialized
with a population (P) of participating units. Next, we initialize n_interac
threads, each simulating an interaction between two participating units,
each sampled without replacement from the population (steps 5,6). Until
a predefined length of an interaction (TMAX), each thread then executes an
actor-critic algorithm (steps 8-14), with the assigned actor and the critic.
Further elements of the game like commitments and entitlements can then
be designed as primitives, depending on the specific application.
11We consider the case where all the participants in the game (players and scorekeepers)
are reinforcement learning based agents. Extension to cases where a portion of the population
is non-AI based, is left as a future work
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Algorithm 5 GOGAR A3C
1: procedure GOGAR-A3C(P)
2: sample n_interac from [0,PC2]
3: initialize n_interac threads
4: for each thread do
5: pu_act← sample from P
6: pu_crit← sample from P \ (pu− act)
7: while t ≤ TMAX do
8: Choose action a according to the actors current policy
pipu_act(.|S, θ)
9: Take action a, observer reward R, and next state S′
10: δ← R + γvˆpu_crit(S′, w)− vˆpu_crit(S, w) . temporal
difference error
11: w← w + βδ∆wvˆpu_crit(S, w) . gradient update of critic’s
value function parameters
12: θ ← θ + αIδ∆θ logpipu_act(A|S, θ) . gradient update of
actors’s policy parameters
13: I ← γI
14: S← S′
15: t← t + 1
16: end while
17: end for
18: end procedure
pu-1
π(a|s,θ) v(s,w)
environment
pu-2
π(a|s,θ) v(s,w)
environment
pu-3
π(a|s,θ) v(s,w)
environment
pu-4
π(a|s,θ) v(s,w)
environment
actor
actor
actor
critic
critic
critic
criticactor
Figure 9: Restructured AC3 with 4 participating units and 3 interactions
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Having addressed the first question by restructuring the A3C algorithm
so that the agents can participate in the game of GOGAR, we now focus on
the second question.
As mentioned in section 3.1, participants in the game of GOGAR can
advance themselves from rational beings to logical beings by deploying
logical vocabulary. One category of logical vocabulary is the conditional
locution of if...then. These condition locutions can also be interpreted as
prediction questions of the form if I do this....then does that happen? In our
restructured implementation of GOGAR-AC3, each participating units hold
a value function representation. These value functions, in principle, can also
be substituted by general value functions (GVF). GVFs are a generalization of
standard value function in reinforcement learning, such that agents are able
to answer prediction questions of the aforementioned form [13]. Although, a
step-by-step re-implementation of GOGAR-AC3 with GVFs instead of value-
functions are left as a future work, with reference to our second question,
we feel confident to answer that it is in principle possible to deploy logical
vocabulary in GOGAR through reinforcement learning.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a Brandom-ian view of reinforcement learning
with the objective of advancing it towards strong-AI. We introduced the
main elements of reinforcement learning, MDPs, and presented some popu-
lar RL algorithms. Next, we presented Brandom’s philosophy, and described
in detail, the mechanism of the Game Of Giving and Asking For Reasons
(GOGAR). As a main contribution, we drew links between the constituting
elements of reinforcement learning and GOGAR. Further we theorize on two
important questions, that we believe lie in the path towards strong-AI. Fi-
nally, we show that it is possible to re-imagine reinforcement learning, with
the help of Brandom’s philosophy, for the objective of achieving strong-AI.
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